# INTRODUCTION
## What is this *IDS strategic approach*

**Mostly, the phrase *strategic approach* is a license for *pinstriped* clad consultants to spout vague generalities with clauses like benchmark and envision.**

***As an alternative, This strategic approach focuses on the 3 key components Why, What & How.***

- ***Why* – Why should I initiate an IDS project**
- ***What* – What should expect in terms of benefit and cost**
- ***How* – How should seek to manage the process**

# IDS & Security

**Security is moribund with vague acronyms:-**

## P.D.R.

**PDR = Protection – Detection – Reaction**

**IDS works in the domain of *Detection***

**This doesn't mean that it is somehow less important.**

**The faster and the more specific your *Detection* – the more efficient your *Reaction – the better your recovery***

# Why do we need a strategic approach

Most IDS projects are perceived as failures. I would estimate at a rate of greater than 70%.

Why – three main risks for your project risk inventory:

- The IDS technology worked but the management expections where completely off target – this type of project could never succede
- The technology is/has been sold as plug and play, so even if the infrastructure could be made to work – the project losses credibility and is scrapped before essentially tailoring is performed
- No organisational or procedural effects are considered, so the firms ability to deal with hackers isn't changed despite the effort and technology

# Summary of stages



# Define Project objectives

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# What an IDS project WILL NOT DO FOR YOU

**Intrusion Detection Systems -**

- **Do not improve poor access controls**
- **Do not replace the need for experts analysis**
- **Do not replace incident procedures**
- **Do not solve your log management headache**
- **Do not run themselves**

# What an IDS project WILL DO FOR YOU

**Intrusion Detection Systems can-**

- **Speed your response to security problems**
- **Fill large holes in a security/monitoring regime**
- **Enhance hack detection, analysis and recovery**
- **Solve your security log *REVIEW* headache**
- **Automate many manual processes**
- **Provide good management info**

# Why start an IDS project

## Triggers for starting an IDS – stage 1

- Attacks volume overwhelms log review
- Focus of attacks changed
- Security more high profile
- Regulatory requirement

# Why start an IDS project

**Regulatory requirement**

**DEFINITE – HK monetary authority**

**singapore monetary authority**

**European central bank**

**Vague – requirement for *formal monitoring regeme***

- **FDIC**
- **FSA**
- **FED**
- **EBR**

# Why start an IDS project

**Volume of attacks drastically increased**

- ☛ size of logs too great for manual
- ☛ "cost" skilled staff too great

***Supporting Stats***

**206 Port scans/month**

**17 NBTscans/day** www.honeynet.org

**Firewall produces 100-500 mb/day** KPMG

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# Security vulnerabilities on the up





** 2002 Figure for 3 of 4 quarters  Source Cert/cc*

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# Security vulnerabilities on the up





** Figure for 3 of 4 quarters Source Cert/cc*

# Focus of attack changed

## Firewalls alone not up to the job alone

# I-spy with my little eye
# the 7 layer OSI

**Content attacks**

Double-decode Hack

HTML print Hack

PHP Bugs

SSL / Appache

**Context attacks**

Fraggle

Evil ping

Port Scan

Sadmind





7 layer osi model

# Content attacks the Norm



# Reasons starting an IDS – stage 1
# Security more high profile




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
Implementation
Strategy

# IDS maturity model



# Decide your final implementation level for stage 1

**Internet Firewall only**

A good starting place as traffic will be very simple

**Perimeter only**

Progress to all perimeter firewalls using the techniques learnt above

**Perimeter only + key subnets**

Beware of switched networks

# Stage 1 – Costs

- **Apart from software, stage 1 costs are low and tangible**
  - Each sensor will require a decent pentium III,
  - 2 nics with a 20 gig hard disk

- **Most IDS will only manage 10-20 sensors on 1 console/event collector**
  - top of the range cpu preferably dual
  - 768mb
  - 300gb disk
  - backup device

# Stage 1 – Benefit formula

**There are many IDS cost/benefit techniques (check sans) – but here is a basic one for starters**

**Tangible cost reduction =**

**{k * "*staff cost of security log review*" }**

**+ *f* ("*average cost of incident*" )**

**K = .90 = reduction in time spent reviewing your firewall logs**

***F* = factor of reduced incidents**

**Av Cost of Incident £30k** ***(DTI/PWC 2002 Survey)***

# Stage 2: Why step-up to host deployments

- Critical servers
- Exposed/shared servers
- Leaky perimeter
- Boot strap poor server security
- Protect old “green screen” type apps
- Poor internal security
- Hi internal threat

# Stage 2 – Costs

- **Apart from software, stage 2 costs hi and intangible**

- **a good HIDS will (often) require event auditing**
  - Auditing often increases server cpu on unix operating systems by 10-15%
  - The ids may add a further 5% on top

  *how many of your servers have a spare 20% cpu & what is the cost of upgrade*

*Beware, if your IDS does not need c2-audit – it might just be doing file CRCs - NAFF*

# Stage 2 – Before buying a hids

- Would a state monitoring program serve you better
- Would an intelligent syslog program serve you better

# Analyse sensor position

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# Sensor position

Not rocket science but it is amazing how many people don't define where. Consider:

- What you are protecting
- What OS or Network type is available
- What is the value of it

# Implement

# Sensors

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# See separate methodology

## $$ Tipp $$

**Run small packages of functional IDS units through a cycle of implement, test & tune policy - then iterate the process for other locations and departments**

**This get results early-on in the project and provides evidence of the Projects success & success before the inevitable performance or maintenance problems emerge**

**See separate methodology**

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# Define Collector position

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# See separate methodology

## $$ Tipp $$

**All large IDS suffer from data problems. Consider**

**•Who gets the data**

**•Who needs an IDS console and who need just alerts from TNG or OpenView**

**•How much data are storing – what are your top-10 events and do they represents over 60 percent of your data? Is stored just to be on the safe-side or for forensic purposes? If Yes get a management reporting product**

**See separate methodology**

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# Define Response Procedures

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**See separate methodology**

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
Define
Management
Information
Required

# $$ Tipp $$

**Getting a large IDS project off the ground is difficult – But the there is no other subject that can provide such good press for hard pressed security analysts -**

**•Produce a few coloured graphs at the end of each project stage – to show all the hack attacks and unauthorised activity. This demonstrates that the product is working.**

**•Produce an attacks against MailServer, Webserver and Firewall report – include it in your monthly or quarterly report to the audit committee. Let them know that risks are really out there.**

**Define**

**Maintenance**

**Processes**

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